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In the last decades, social and natural scientists have worked
towards an improved understanding of disasters and risks. This has
increased the understanding of natural hazards, which can e but
not necessarily have to e cause disasters, as well as it has built up
knowledge on vulnerability and the social dimension of risk.
Increasingly, social scientists have drawn attention to the fact that
every disaster is the result of the societal embedding in which a
hazardous event occurs (White, 1974). To illustrate this: an earth-
quake in the desert, neither affecting any infrastructure nor
harming any person, does not cause a disaster. It is the exposure of
humans and of human-made infrastructure to hazards, which can
result in a disaster if several factors add up.
This exposure to or rather the likelihood of people, infrastruc-
ture and built property being affected by a hazard is called risk,
while a disaster, according to UNISDR (2009), can be deﬁned as a
disruption that makes external help necessary. In addition to this
very simple deﬁnition, disasters are characterized by being caused
by rare events, occurring in low frequency having a high amplitude.
Finally, the causation of disasters is usually complex, extendingwell
beyond the actual trigger event. Spatial knowledge of structures,
processes and actors that shape disasters, and their impacts on
communities, can help to improve risk governance and to design
adequate disaster management measures.
The vulnerability against extreme events differs signiﬁcantly* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: butschc@uni-koeln.de (C. Butsch).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.12.017
0197-3975/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article ubetween nations of different income levels. As Khan (2005) illus-
trates in his comparison of 73 nations, the number of fatalities from
natural disasters is not related to the exposure towards extreme
events but depends on the strength of the institutional set up. With
the institutional set up being generally weaker in low- and middle-
income countries, even simple and cost effective measures are
often not applied there (Kenny 2012). Therefore, extreme events
have a higher direct impact in low- andmiddle-income countries in
terms of tangible and intangible losses and in many cases they
disrupt the development paths of speciﬁc population groups
(usually the poor) or whole regions.
Considered against this background, disasters in megacities of
low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) justly receive growing
attention in the risk and disaster research community amidst the
wake of the global urbanisation process. In our now predominantly
urban world the urban population is predicted to increase from 3.9
billion in 2014 to 6.3 billion by 2050 (UNDESA, 2014a: 20). This
urban growth will almost entirely take place in low- and middle-
income countries. In these, also the majority of megacities (larger
than 10 million inhabitants) are and will be located. In 2014,
megacities were home to 12% of the world's urban population and
their number is predicted to increase from 28 in 2014 to 41 in 2030
(UNDESA, 2014a: 13).
As extreme products of current global urbanization processes,
megacities of the LMIC are characterized by „increasing socio-
economic vulnerability due to increasing poverty, socio-spatial
and political-institutional fragmentation and often extreme forms
of segregation, disparities, and conﬂicts“ (Kraas, 2007: 80). Thus,
megacities of the LMIC as important nodes in the networks of the
globalising world in can be addressed as “global risk areas” (Kraas,
2003: 10) with a much greater vulnerability than those of the
megacities in high income countries (Wenzel, Bendimerad, & Sina,
2007). This characterization points to the fact that megacities of the
LMIC are characterized by a hitherto unknown level of complexity
(e.g. Parker, 1995; Kopfmüller, Lehn, & Nuissl, 2009) which may
have serious implications in the risk and disaster context, as wewill
exemplify for the case of Mumbai in detail.
The analysis of the various factors that caused disasters in the
past can help to sharpen the perception for the complex causation
of disasters and enables decision makers to identify relevantnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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more adequately in the future. Our guiding research question is
therefore: Does the application of a Complex Adaptive System
perspective help to improve mega-urban risk governance and
disaster management?
The paper is structured in the following way. First, it critically
discusses an analytical framework for Complex Adaptive Systems in
relation to the following questions: Which factors produce risk in
complex mega-urban systems and how are they related? Which
structures, processes and actors are involved in coping with mega-
urban risks, disasters, crisis and conﬂicts? What are possible ways
for dealing with the complexity of multi-stakeholder environments
in mega-urban areas?
Second, in the empirical section the 2005 ﬂood events in Mum-
bai/India will be described. In addition to the actual ﬂood event, the
change of risk governance and disaster management following the
disaster (the reorganization of the system) is illustrated. These
ﬁndings are based on empirical ﬁeldwork in 2009 and 2010.
In the discussion we will interpret the empirical ﬁndings of the
case study against the background of the theoretical framework.
The potential of spatial knowledge for improving risk governance
and designing disaster management in a megacity, understood as a
Complex Adaptive System, will be discussed. In the conclusion, we
will look at lessons learned from the Mumbai case study and point
out the added value of a systems theory perspective onmega-urban
risk and disasters.
2. A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) perspective on mega-
urban risk and disasters
Themegacities of the LMIC are exposed to a number of risks. First,
they are often located in areas highly exposed to hazards (e.g. due to
the proximity to coastlines or tectonic fault lines, climate zones etc.).
Second, risks in these cities are shaped by the diverse internal social,
political, economic, ecological and cultural processes, which inter-
fere with and inﬂuence each other, as well as by the accumulation of
critical urban infrastructure. As the formal economy of these ag-
glomerations often does not grow in the same pace as the popula-
tion, informality and informal dynamics are no exemption. This
affects all aspects of life, and the resulting loss of governability leads
to an increase in disaster vulnerability. The gradient of vulnerability
of thepopulation is closely related to socioeconomicdisparities,with
the poorest usually being most vulnerable (Kraas, 2003, 2007).
Yet, megacities are not only places of high risk but also of high
potential and some aspects of informality can also turn out to be
assets in regard to disaster risk reduction or disaster response:
Informal networks, often hindering planned development, rein-
forcing path dependencies and sometimes decreasing efﬁciency,
have proven to be importantmeans of ﬁrst response during disasters
(cf. section three). Megacities' positions within their respective na-
tional economies, their connection to global networks and the
accumulation of resources (knowledge, capital, political power) en-
ables them to recover fromdisasters fast on a systemic level, inter alia
because they can often effectively raise external help quickly, if
necessary. Besides formal mechanisms of disaster relief, informal
structures can inmany cases also be regarded as an asset. Since social
networks and local self-organization processes are means of man-
aging everyday life, they also complement or even substitute ofﬁcial
structures in disaster management as a speciﬁc aspect of life e and
sometimes theyevendo somorequickly (Kraas, 2012;Wisner, 2003).
Complexity, informality, vulnerability, resilience and risk thus
are aspects, which are closely connected in the context of mega-
urban disasters. Elsewhere we have argued, that the interactions
between various factors turning an event or hazard into a disaster
can be understood better if a system perspective is applied (Peterset al. 2015). In this understanding, megacities are framed as Com-
plex Adaptive Systems (CAS) characterized by the three axioms of
chaos-theory. 1) The dynamics of these systems is unforeseeable
due to the high number of inter-linkages and feedback-
mechanisms. 2) Minimal changes can trigger maximum changes.
3) Such dynamic systems will start to produce stable patterns and
structures if the external inﬂuences (e.g. inﬂow of energy and
matter) remain unchanged. The complexity of CAS emerges from
the unexpected dynamics characterizing these systems. These dy-
namics are the result of the nonlinear interactions between the
systems' elements, which lead to self-reinforcing or self-
moderating processes (Norberg & Cumming, 2008).
One additional distinct feature of CAS is co-evolution
(Kauffmann 1990). In cities, this means that physical infrastruc-
ture and social structures are inﬂuencing each other and certain
processes are reinforcing each other through the creation of path
dependencies, which are bound to different types of infrastructure.
But co-evolution in a human-made system also means, that there is
the possibility to guide this co-evolution and adapt it to counteract
new risks. Unfortunately, in a CAS co-evolution makes it impossible
to foresee all possible developments. In the panarchical perspective
(panarchy being the antithesis to hierarchy, meaning that small
changes in subsystems have the potential to cause disproportional
disturbance at higher system levels), any element in the system can
potentially trigger changes that can ultimately affect the system as
a whole (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).
In the context of urban research, especially dealing with di-
sasters in urban areas, this understanding of systems can provide
new perspectives. It allows for describing actual urban dynamics,
which are not aiming at an equilibrium state but produce imbal-
ances at various levels (inﬂow and discharge of matter, but also
social inequities and power-imbalances) and are governed by a mix
of formal and informal institutions. The latter poses a severe
challenge, since the transfer of knowledge between formal and
informal institution often does not take place. These distinct fea-
tures of CAS seem to be well suited for applying a systemic
perspective on cities in the risk governance context. The general
applicability of system theory for understanding risk governance
has been principally proven by other scholars who have con-
ceptualised cities as Social-Ecological Systems (SES). Especially
ﬂood events have been successfully analysed from this perspective
(e.g. Birkmann, Garschagen, Kraas, & Quang, 2010; Pahl-Wostl,
2007). The SES perspective is closely related to the CAS perspec-
tive but focuses more on the assessment of vulnerability and
resilience. This strand of research is especially investigating how
society and environment interact in coupled systems, how
ecosystem services are produced and consumed and how this af-
fects system dynamics and the amount of change these systems can
undergo and still provide adequate ecosystem services (Adger,
Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstr€om, 2005).
Going beyond the earlier conceptualisations of cities as socio-
ecological systems, we have developed a framework that allows
for an analytic perspective on risk and disasters in megacities (cf.
Fig. 1; in more detail cf. Peters et al. 2015). The visualisation was
developed to illustrate how the megaurbanmega-urban disaster
concept can be framed from a CAS perspective. Yet, we can of
course not map complexity realistically but only hint at the mul-
tiple connections. As such the strength of the CAS approach is its
ability to simplify complexity. This allows for a transfer of this
approach to the political sphere (Welsh, 2013).
The framework puts disaster in the centre of the analysis and
aims at explaining its genesis and its consequences, thereby focus-
sing on knowledge and management aspects of disasters. The
disaster itself marks in a temporal perspective the turning point
between risk governance and disaster response and recovery, which
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tion of the risk governance aspect, our (spatial) knowledge about the
formation of a disaster. It shows variousmediate (secondary, tertiary
etc.) and immediate (primary) risk factors that shape the environ-
ment in which a hazard can actually trigger a disaster. What is
crucial in this perspective is that not only the immediate factors are
taken into consideration, but also mediate factors of ﬁrst and sec-
ondary order. Ideally, this perspective allows for understanding the
underlying root causes of disasters. Accordingly, the lower sphere in
the framework shows themultiple and sometimes long-term effects
of disasters. These are direct (primary) effects and further effects
triggered by these primary effects themselves, but also new risks
that arise in the disaster situation. We therefore distinguish be-
tween 1) direct and indirect effects, 2) risk chains and 3) risk cas-
cades. Risk chains emerge when the direct effects of a disasterFig. 1. Visualisation of a comprehensive, complex, holistic multi-staconstitute new hazards through linear pathways while risk cascades
are also triggered by the effects of the disaster but unfold through
multiple and complex pathways in a non-linear fashion (for a more
detailed description cf. Peters et al. 2015).
What is unique about this CAS perspective on risk and disaster is
the holistic perspective, which points to the following aspects
(Fig. 1): 1) the complex causation of disasters has to be considered
in effective risk governance strategies, which e based on holistic
analysis e aim not only at the triggering event and the primary
inﬂuencing factors but also take root causes into consideration; 2)
multiple interactions and reinforcing processes have to be taken
into consideration in the causation of disasters and in disaster
management; 3) besides the direct effects there are indirect long-
term effects of disasters, which can be understood better from a
systemic point of view; 4) for understanding risk in a complexkeholder risk framework of a Complex Adaptive System (CAS).
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edge need to be combined, as the dominant scientiﬁc-technological
approach, usually applied in risk governance, is inadequate to
integrate social aspects; 5) combining different types of knowledge
(institutional knowledge, scientiﬁc knowledge, experiential
knowledge etc.) of the actual situation and past events are needed
to understand mega-urban disaster risk complexes.
3. Understanding the complexity of ﬂood risks in Mumbai,
India
3.1. Local factors of ﬂood risk
Flood risk in Mumbai is constituted by the city's location and its
morphological structure. Mumbai is a costal city located in the
tropical wet and dry climate zone (Aw in the K€oppen climate
classiﬁcation). Between June and September the city receives
2500 mm of its annual precipitation of 2700 mm (de Sherbinin,
Schiller, & Pulsipher, 2007: 46). The city's morphology, which has
been crafted over centuries, contributes to the risk of ﬂooding:
Founded by the Portuguese as Bom Bahia (the „good bay“) the site
was controlled by the British from 1661 onwards, who connected
the original seven islands into the peninsula that today is the centre
of the urban agglomeration (Mumbai Metropolitan Area) with its
more than 18 million inhabitants (in 20111) (de Sherbinin, 2007).
Many of the land reclamation areas are of low elevation, most of
them situated only a few meters above sea level and some even
below (Government of Maharashtra, 2006). Hardly any natural
system of creeks or rivers exists in these parts of the city, which are
traversed by an artiﬁcial system of canals built by the British. An
additional factor, which signiﬁcantly increases the ﬂood risk is the
massive degradation of natural vegetation: once mangroves served
as a protection against ﬂooding from the sea and the formerly thick
forests in Salsette had a higher inﬁltration capacity than the current
land use, resulting in a slower discharge (Srivastava & Mukherji
2005).
The human-made landscape of the city together with the
climate therefore constitutes a certain exposure towards the risk of
ﬂooding. This risk is ampliﬁed by the way the city is governed: For
instance, the underperformance of the municipal waste manage-
ment system, which has led to huge quantities of waste being
disposed off into rivers and canals by the population, has become a
signiﬁcant causative factor of blockages of the drainage system.
Also, the lack of control of land use regulations and building stan-
dards has resulted in an increase in ﬂood risk, since houses are built
on river banks and ﬂood plains. This results in a direct exposure to
ﬂoods and a reduction of retention areas, which increases the
severity of ﬂoods within the whole city. Secondary risks are related
to the design of the city's critical infrastructure, especially the
transport infrastructure. The airport is located in a ﬂood prone area
on the banks of Mithi River and several nullahs (creeks) cross the
airport area. The suburban railroad trafﬁc, the city's lifeline, which
is used by two to three million commuters daily to get to the city
centre in the South of the peninsula, is collapsing partially during
heavy rainfalls, affecting the livelihoods of millions and the func-
tioning of the world city's economy.
The annual monsoon rainfall results in recurring inundation,
putting severe strains on livelihoods (de Sherbinin et al. 2007) and
increasing gastrointestinal and vector borne diseases. Small areas
are ﬂooded regularly with 0.5e1.5 m of water (Gupta, 2009). These
annual ﬂoods are by most people not perceived as disastrous sit-
uations: „[in] Bombay 10e20 cm is nothing, it is only when you1 http://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/365-mumbai.html.have 60 cm, 80 cm, [… ] otherwise we can't call it a ﬂood“ (expert
interview with the municipal corporation). However, this
constantly recurring loss of assets and negative impacts on human
health signiﬁcantly increase the baseline vulnerability in the
affected areas, especially in the slum settlements.3.2. Material and methods
Two research areas were chosen that were affected by the 2005
ﬂood in Mumbai: one consolidated slum settlement called Shastri
Nagar and an inner city middle income area called Ashok Nagar
(Map 1). Fieldwork was conducted in 2009 and 2010 to collect data
on factors inﬂuencing the ﬂood risk, general exposure towards
hazards, effects of the 2005 ﬂood, help and support networks for
dealing with ﬂoods, changes in risk governance and socioeconomic
characteristics of the households in the research areas. For the data
collection in Mumbai a multi-method framework was applied.
During the ﬁeldwork, 17 expert interviews were conducted with
representatives of the state government, theMunicipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai (Brihanmumbai Mumbai Corporation e BMR),
the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) and represen-
tatives from several NGOs and research institutions. In the two
research areas participatory urban appraisal (PUA) methods, such
as transects, cause-and-effect diagrams and Venn-diagrams, were
combined with unstructured interviews, mapping and photo-
graphic documentation to explore the research areas. A household
survey was undertaken in randomly selected households (99 in
Shastri Nagar,101 in Ashok Nagar). The survey consisted of different
modules on the household structure, experiences with past ﬂood-
ing events and other types of disasters (health crisis, social unrest),
housing structure and socioeconomic status of the household. To
assess the latter, the availability of assets in the households wasMap 1. Location of the study areas in Mumbai (own design).
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sides the monetary income. Following Butsch (2011: 128) the
availability of 22 items was recorded. These items were given
different scores in the analysis: one for basic items, two for tech-
nical equipment (mobile phone, water ﬁltering system), three for
advanced and expensive technical equipment (computer, land line
phones, motorbikes) and four for car ownership. Based on this a
wealth score was calculated for every household by summing up
the score of the items present in the particular household. In total a
maximum score of 41 could be achieved for the 22 items.
The standardized interviews were either undertaken in English
or Marathi, supported by an interpreter. From the household
sample 18 typical and extreme cases were selected for problem-
centred interviews and as participants for focus group discus-
sions. The household survey was analysed by descriptive statistical
methods. The recordings of qualitative method conductions (PUA,
expert interviews, problem-centred interviews, focus group dis-
cussions) were transcribed (and translated if necessary) and sub-
jected to qualitative content analysis.
3.3. The 2005 ﬂood event
In July 2005, Mumbai was affected by an extraordinary heavy
and very local rainfall event. In the north of Mumbai (Santa Cruz),
944 mm of rainfall fell within 24 h, while in the south (Colaba) only
74mmof rainfall weremeasured (Gupta, 2009: 241f.). The resulting
areal ﬂooding affected 22% of the whole area of the city
(Government of Maharashtra, 2006: 15). Since the ﬂood affected
mostly the northern areas of the peninsula, the city centre in the
south was affected indirectly, as it was almost completely cut off
from themainland. About 2million people were unable to leave the
downtown area due to the failure of transport infrastructure
(especially the railroad network) and about 2.5 million people were
trapped by inundation (Government of Maharashtra, 2006: 15). In
total 450 people died in ﬂash ﬂoods, landslides and the collapse of
provisional buildings e especially in slum areas e and from elec-
trocution (Government of Maharashtra, 2006: 247, Gupta, 2009).
Secondary risks arose from the catastrophic hygienic conditions,
the cut of power supply and the partial collapse of the fresh water
supply and the communication system (expert interviews). This led
inter alia to several waterborne diseases like hepatitis and gastro-
intestinal infections, resulting in 248 additional deaths
(Government of Maharashtra, 2006: 247, Gupta, 2009). In the wake
of the ﬂood an increase in vector-borne diseases was observable
that can be linked to stagnant waters, which remained long after
ﬂood waters receded (Source: own interviews ExIMum0002, ExI-
Mum0013a cf. references section, Gupta, 2009). Long-term health
effects are expected because of the population's exposure towards
chemicals like cyanide, which entered into the ﬂoodwater in high
quantities when illegal small-scale industries were inundated,
surpassing the concentration usually caused by illegal discharge
(Ellenrieder, 2006). These events can be interpreted against the
background of the framework developed in section two as risk
chains (inundation e land slides e collapse of buildings) or as risk
cascades (inundation resulting in a) vector breeding and b) pollu-
tion of thewater, resulting inmultiple negative health effects). For a
better understanding and prediction of these risk chains and risk
cascades, the application of a spatial perspective can be very
valuable. Many secondary risks are actually the result of locational
effects, e.g. the aforementioned discharge of chemicals into the
ﬂoodwater arose from the chemical plants' location in ﬂood prone
areas. Therefore also spatial aspects e based on spatial knowledge
e of linkages within CAS are important for understanding feedback
mechanisms and amplifying factors.
The tangible damage of about 770 Million US $ of insureddamage (and probably a multitude of this in uninsured damages)
was the highest ever experienced in India till date (Ellenrieder,
2006: 40). Additionally, the state and municipality had to carry
the costs of recovering the damaged infrastructure. On a higher
scale, the national GDPwas affected as theMumbai stock exchange,
India's leading ﬁnancial centre, had to be closed: „If Mumbai stands
still for a day, ok. But catastrophic impacts cause a tremendous
problem for the national GDP. And therefore any hazard or any
disaster in the city is not affordable for the national GDP“
(ExIMum0015).
Apart from ofﬁcial key actors in the disaster response, namely
local authorities (municipal corporation staff, police, ﬁre-ﬁghters)
and NGOs, most of the interviewed experts also highlighted the
decisive role of the civil society during the 2005 ﬂood: “So most
people [… ] just walked home and then saw what all was in their
house. You know you had one gunny-bag of rice. They just cooked
the whole thing, as long as the gas lasted. If they had two liters of
milk they made tea, if they had dhal they just cooked it, if they
had vegetables they cooked the whole thing. Then they just
brought out what they had and then everyone on the roads, stuck,
just ate from it. They protected each others' properties“ (ExI-
Mum0011b). This ”spirit of the Mumbaikars” (ExIMum0017) is
believed by most to have contributed signiﬁcantly to minimizing
negative consequences and restoring essential functions in a
quick and efﬁcient manner. The experts mention especially the
ingenuity, talent for improvisation, solution orientation and
cohesion in the neighbourhoods as essential for coping with
shocks on a small scale instead of relying on external help, which
serves as an example for spatio-social construction of knowledge
within the community. Thus, informal structures, actors, and
processes are highly important in dealing with risk and have to be
included in the knowledge that is generated and collected on risk.
3.4. Implications and perception of risk in Shastri Nagar and Ashok
Nagar
The implications and perception of ﬂood risk in general and the
consequences of the 2005 ﬂood were studied in detail in two
selected research areas. Shastri Nagar is situated on the banks of the
Mithi River. The approximately 1000 households are situated in
one- or two-storey buildings on a plot of land of about 0.3 km2,
bordered by a light industry area. In most cases, the land is not
owned by the inhabitants, but they rent it and construct the house,
which they then own (83%, own survey). This so-called Pagadi
system is typical for Mumbai where especially in informal settle-
ments the land is owned by “slum lords” who rent plots of land to
the tenants who are responsible for the construction and mainte-
nance of buildings (Sheth, Velaga, & Price, 2009). Inside the set-
tlement, there are several small shops and businesses. A few roads,
accessible for small cars and rickshaws, traverse the area. However,
most houses are only accessible via small alleys only suitable for
pedestrians. Not all the houses are permanent structures; the roofs
are mostly made frommetal sheets and corrugated iron, some from
wood; most walls are made from concrete and for three per cent
mud or metal sheets are used. In respect to the ﬂood risk, only 25%
of the households have elevated entrances (own survey).
Not all the houses offer basic amenities: 25% of the surveyed
households do not have a water tap in their house. The drainage
system is based on open canals in the small alleys and often fresh
water pipes are placed within these canals, resulting in regular
contamination of fresh water. Since water is delivered by the
municipal corporation, usually in morning hours only, the water
pressure is lowmost of the day, so that wastewater enters the pipes
through leakages, joints and ﬁttings.
In the settlement, Muslims (55%) and Hindus (36%) live in
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Fig. 2. Effects of annual ﬂood events in Ashok Nagar and Shastri Nagar, own survey.
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Fig. 3. Effects of the 2005 ﬂood in Ashok Nagar and Shastri Nagar, own survey.
C. Butsch et al. / Habitat International 54 (2016) 100e111 105clearly separated areas (data in section stems from the own survey).
The household size in the whole area is quite large: 49% of the
households comprise six or more members. The demographic
proﬁle of the surveyed households indicates that the population is
relatively young, with an average age of 27 years, while the sex ratio
is in favour of male inhabitants (984 women/1000 men). About
seven per cent of the households reported an income below the
ofﬁcial poverty line of 665 INR per person per month.2 Another 17%
reported an income that was above the poverty line but less than
double the amount of the ofﬁcial poverty line. In Shastri Nagar, the2 State Speciﬁc Poverty Line deﬁned by the Planning Commission for Urban
Maharashtra 2005-05 accessible at http://planningcommission.gov.in/news/
prmar07.pdf (accessed 11-Febr-2015); equals 10.71 $US on February 15th 2015.average score of the wealth index is 14.5, indicating that many
households can hardly afford basic amenities (minimum: ﬁve,
maximum: 31, standard deviation: 6.3).
The situation is quite different in Ashok Nagar: The average
wealth index there is 25.3 (minimum: eight, maximum: 40, stan-
dard deviation: 8.5), indicating that many households cannot only
well afford to cover all basic amenities but also have access to
advanced technical equipment. This is also reﬂected in responses
regarding the household income: Almost two thirds of the house-
holds (64.3%) have an income which is more than ten times higher
than the ofﬁcial poverty line. Accordingly, basic amenities like
piped water and toilets can be found in every house. This typical
middle class area is situated in Santa Cruz East, South of the Air
India Colony. The area covers roughly 0.4 km2 and hosts mainly
multi-storey buildings and few single-family houses. These are all
3 for this question multiple answers were possible.
C. Butsch et al. / Habitat International 54 (2016) 100e111106pucca structures (solid built) and most of the multi-storey houses
are cooperative housing societies, some of which were constructed
as slum rehabilitation measures. During the time of the household
survey there was a lot of on-going construction work, several new
multi-storey houses (up to 20 ﬂoors) were being built. The areawas
exclusively used for housing. However, on the ground ﬂoors of
some houses there were shops and businesses, and medical clinics.
Regarding the exposure to ﬂoods, often the ground ﬂoor was not
used for housing in multi-storey buildings.
The household size is signiﬁcantly smaller: 69% of the house-
holds have between three to ﬁve members and ﬁve per cent are
single households. While 89% own the house inwhich they live,11%
live in rented accommodation. In total there are fewer younger
persons living here and the average age is 34. The gender ratio is
even more in favour of the male inhabitants (955 women/1000
men). 79% of the surveyed households in this area are Hindus, nine
per cent Christians, six per cent Jains, ﬁve per cent Muslims and one
per cent Buddhists.
In Ashok Nagar there is a central canal of about 10 m inwidth. It
is a tributary of the Mithi river. This canal is often jammed because
it is regularly used as a site for waste disposal. This canal is decisive
for the exposure of the area towards ﬂood risk.
Both of the study areas are affected by annual ﬂooding events
during themonsoon period. In Ashok Nagar, 92% of the respondents
in the household survey said, that their neighbourhood is affected
by inundation during the monsoon, in Shastri Nagar the share was
97%. However, these aremostly singular events. In Ashok Nagar 75%
of the respondents said, that their neighbourhood is affected only
once a year, in Shastri Nagar 80% said so. These annual ﬂood events
have different effects in the two research areas, related to differ-
ences in housing structures (Fig. 2). As most of the slum homes
have their entrance and living room on the ground ﬂoor, they are
directly exposed to the primary effects of inundation events. One
third of the respondents said, that water enters their house regu-
larly and 21% reported that furniture is thereby destroyed. This is
different in themiddle class area, wheremost respondents reside in
multi-storey buildings. Only seven per cent reported water in the
house during monsoonal ﬂooding and only 5% reported destroyed
furniture. In both areas, the majority of respondents reported that
there is an accumulation of mud around their houses and 50% of all
respondents indicated an increase of diseases during or shortly
after these ﬂood events. Especially the rise of malaria is attributed
to the annual ﬂoods.
In both areas, the effects of the 2005 ﬂood were more severe
than those of earlier events. In Ashok Nagar, 91% of the households
reported that they were affected by the 2005 ﬂood, in Shastri Nagar
97%. In Shastri Nagar, 89% of the respondents reported, that water
entered in their house, 87% indicated that furniture was destroyed
and almost two thirds had to leave the house because there was no
electricity or drinking water available (Fig. 3). One of the house-
holds also reported a fatality. The ﬂood affected the livelihoods of
the respondents: In Shastri Nagar four per cent and in Ashok Nagar
three per cent said that their shops were ﬂooded. The relatively
high share of respondents mentioning diseases as an effect of the
ﬂood event can be interpreted as the outcome of a risk chain, which
was triggered by the disaster. In Ashok Nagar not only the primary
effects were less (31% reported water in the house and destroyed
furniture, 24% had to leave their houses), but also the secondary
effects of the disaster were fewer. This holds also true for the cost of
recovery from the disaster. In Ashok Nagar 48% of the households
said that they did not face any cost and only 27% reported relatively
high costs of recovery, exceeding 50,000 INR. In Shastri Nagar, 49%
of the households said that the costs of recovery exceeded 50,000
INR, ﬁve per cent said that they could not name the amount they
spent and the rest reported relatively large sums (16%: between10,000 INR and 30,000 INR; 23%: 30,000 INR to 50,000 INR).
With hardly any household insured in both areas (zero per cent
in Shastri Nagar, ten per cent in Ashok Nagar), the cost of the
disaster had a negative long-term effect. However, there was a state
funded compensation scheme, which provided 5,000 INR as a
compensation for affected households. In Shastri Nagar 84% of the
households reported having received this compensation, in Ashok
Nagar 25% of all households have received monetary compensation
for their loss, some even exceeding those 5,000 INR paid by the
government if they were insured.
3.5. Risk governance: responses, support and local engagement
The information policy and ﬂoodwarning by the authorities was
assessed quite negatively. Only two respondents in Ashok Nagar
said that they were warned before the ﬂood struck their neigh-
bourhood, while in Shastri Nagar all respondents said that the ﬂood
reached them unprepared. This is partly related to the fact that
several communication systems failed during the 2005 ﬂood event.
Experts said, that landline telephones did not work in most of the
affected areas, even satellite communication (for the emergency
response forces) was not possible. Several experts reported prob-
lems with mobile communication systems (ExIMum0002, ExI-
Mum0003). One expert summarized: „It was like everyone was
lost. But worst was the loss of communication […]We could not say
what was happening where and how” (ExIMum0003).
Due to these problems, the municipal and state disaster man-
agement forces were hardly able to respond immediately and in a
coordinated manor. After being asked who helped them during the
ﬂood one interviewee said: „No one, we were sitting here only“.
Instead, informal social networks were the most important and
immediate means in disaster response. In Shastri Nagar 52% said3
that they received help from their neighbours during the ﬂood,
51% from their family or friends (quantitative data in this section
stems from the household survey). Help from local authorities (one
per cent), the military (three per cent) and the local ward ofﬁcers
(three per cent) were of minor importance compared to that. In
total 26% of the respondents said that they did not receive any help.
In Ashok Nagar, this share was a little higher at 37%. Here, neigh-
bours were also the most important source of immediate help at
46%, followed by 37% who received help from their family or
friends. Also local authorities (two per cent) the military (zero per
cent) and local ward ofﬁcers (zero per cent) were not perceived as
sources of immediate disaster relief.
In the days and weeks following the ﬂood, the two areas
received attention from different actors. In Shastri Nagar, one per-
son reported: „ [During the ﬂood] nobody helped. Help came after
three to four days. After four days we got help: ten kg rice, ten liters
kerosene“. In Ashok Nagar, 62% of the respondents said, that they
did not receive any help for recovering after the disaster, 19%
underlined the help from their neighbours, 14% from family and
friends. Interestingly, different external actors were involved in the
disaster response measures, even if only few received help from
them: local authorities (four per cent), NGOs (six per cent), ward
ofﬁcer (one per cent) and the local representative to the corpora-
tion council (corporator) (ﬁve per cent). In Shastri Nagar, the pic-
ture is completely different. Only nine per cent of the respondents
said that they did not receive any help after the disaster. Friends
and family were with 30% as important as neighbours (31%).
However, massive engagement of other actors emerged: 60% said
that political parties helped them to recover from the negative ef-
fects of the ﬂood, 42% named the local authorities as institutions
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mentioned (seven per cent), NGOs (six per cent), ward ofﬁcer (11%),
the local corporator (24%).
3.6. Aftermath: back to normal?
Themassivemobilization of disaster response forces by the state
and other actors after the water receeded resulted in the city
returning to „normal life“ quickly. The train services e the city's
“life lines” e resumed on 28th July and returned to the normal
schedule within one to four weeks. Stranded cars were cleaned off
the streets within days, the power supply restored after the water
receded, and the airport reopened after two days (Fact Finding
Committee on Mumbai Floods 2006). However, there were
numerous long-term consequences. In several cases those who
were affected by the ﬂood had difﬁculties to recover from the ef-
fects, as mentioned in a problem-centred interview in Shastri
Nagar:
“… and if it all gets messed up … I couldn't take it and it was
very difﬁcult to get back to normal … and settling things …
because my father was the only one who was earning and get-
ting back all the things … because right now everything you
require in the house … and everything getting scattered … I
don't have the words to explain. I still have the fear in me and
you know it's very difﬁcult to get back to your normal life”
(PCIMum0002).
The individual development paths, especially of the affected
poor households, were thus signiﬁcantly disrupted, due to the loss
of savings and assets, which they had accumulated over several
years. Under the surface, the return to “normal life” therefore
sometimes did not take place or only after a longer period of time.
At the city level, structural changes were initiated to reduce the
impacts of ﬂood events in the future. Themunicipal government set
up a network of 30 automated rainfall-radar-stations, which now
help to identify critical locations better and faster. Also the city's
drainage network receives more attention and annual cleaning
drives of the nullahs ensure their maximum discharge capacity.
Several technical measures were put in place, such as ﬂood walls,
pump stations and emergency shelters. The prediction of rainfall
events was increased by the installation of a Doppler Radar station.
In addition, Mumbai changed the risk governance and disaster
management procedures (restructuring responsibilities within the
administration, creating the disaster management cell within the
administration). In the new disaster management plan decision-
making competencies were streamlined to minimize response
times and effectively make use of existing resources in case of di-
sasters of “exceptionally large magnitude”. In this case a State Ex-
ecutive Sub-Committee for Mumbai, chaired by the Additional
Chief Secretary (Home) and the Municipal Commissioner, will take
over the coordination of disaster relief measures of different
agencies, including municipal and state agencies as well as the
National Defence Services (Army and Navy).
3.7. Efforts for resilience and spatial knowledge construction
The 2005 Mumbai ﬂoods initiated a series of actions by the
authorities with the help of various private institutions and col-
lective action by the people. Use of information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) in mitigation and management of disaster
became an important part of planning processes at local, city and
regional level. As the loss for the city economy was estimated to be
around $100 million (UNICEF, 2006; without pages) in just two
days, efforts were made to minimize future losses caused by ﬂoods.Besides the measures described in section 3.6 ICT for disaster
mitigation and management has been set-up to be used in Mumbai
for disaster management. Technically these have been designed in a
way, that even in case of a longer black out, main communication
channels can bemaintained through stand alone battery systems at
various locations in the city.
In the case of Mumbai the construction of local knowledge along
with published knowledge and use of ICT for use in disaster risk
reduction was very important. “A state mode of dealing with the
problem to a societal mode of handling them, with the inclusion of
the state” (Baud, Pfeffer, Sydenstricker, & Scott, 2011: 2) came into
being in handling the ﬂoods in Mumbai. Along with the University
of Kyoto, the Japanese Aid Agency the Greater Mumbai Municipal
Corporation (Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation e BMC) used
local knowledge on the ﬂooding and its impact on local commu-
nities in various slums (School of Planning and Architecture, New
Delhi, 2009). This information was collected through surveys in
ﬂood affected areas by BMC and an Indo-Japanese research team.
Spatial knowledge, in terms of adaptation/mitigation strategies
were developed through the use of ICT, especially mobile phone
technology (Meier, 2008) and informing local citizens about
weather variations in the city and potential ﬂood zones. SMS are
sent to all mobile devices, which are connected to the mobile
network in cells in which ﬂooding is expected. Additionally BMC
uses the networks/data bases of different institutions (e.g. the so-
cial media accounts or the information networks of companies,
such as banks or of NGOs) to communicate about impending
inundation events. The high coverage of mobile connectivity and
user ratio of social media in Mumbai (cf. Department of
Telecommunications, 2014, Ibrahim, 2009) ensures a good
coverage of the population through these measures. This approach
of spatial knowledge distribution became a unique model, which
later was replicated several times in other potentially disaster
affected areas, such as Orissa, Andhra, and Tamil Nadu.
For the ﬁrst time, the multi-scalar governance system (Barnett
and Scott, 2007) was used and integrated systematically to
address issues of disaster. After the 2005 ﬂoods a new committee
was established to assess Mumbai's ﬂood preparedness each year
prior to the onset of the monsoon. The Chief Minister of Mahara-
shtra State heads the pre-monsoon Disaster Committee and the
Municipal Corporation Irrigation Department and Urban Develop-
ment Department of the Government of Maharashtra work in
tandem to forewarn the people about potential critical situations
for evacuation. This governance model was extended to various
other stakeholders, who were roped into the system, such as
ﬁnancial institutions (this was important since the ﬁnancial loss
due to ﬂoods in 2005 was very high), educational institutions, and
later to community networks. As discussed by many authors (Baud
et al. 2011; Brenner, 2004; Robinson, 2008) governments, espe-
cially local governments all over the world, depend on local net-
works, especially economic and social networks in decision-making
process. These networked decisions, especially in disaster mitiga-
tion and resilience, became a reality in Mumbai in the post-disaster
period in 2005.
The delay in response by formal institutions during the 2005
ﬂood event brought many community-based organizations in
Mumbai together in developing spatial knowledge in the ﬁeld of
disaster mitigation and community resilience towards disaster. As
Gaillard and Maceda (2009) stated, it was realized that disaster
mitigation and resilience had to involve local communities and be
“people-centric” and “community-centric”, if the efforts are to be
sustainable. Area-based approaches through Advanced Local Area
Management (ALM) committees, which were set up earlier and
used for waste management, were utilized to create awareness
about disaster at the local level thereby making the spatial
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forms ALMs through its ward ofﬁces about possible inundation
events in advance, asking them to distribute the information in
their respective neighbourhoods. Additionally, ﬂood area predic-
tion, depending on the amount of rainfall, has becomemore precise
with the implementation of specialised software donated by the
Japanese government. This GIS based software enables area-wise
prediction of ﬂood prone zones, once information about the
extent of rainfall is fed into the system. BMC engineers along with
Irrigation department engineers were trained on this ﬂood man-
agement software in Japan during a capacity building programme.
Both, the ICT tools provided by the Japanese Government and the
involvement of ALMs together make it easier to predict impending
disaster and to take mitigation efforts based on early warning
systems.
Developing spatial knowledge through multiple sources in the
post-disaster period, especially through participatory knowledge
construction at the local level, and dissemination of the same
through community, social and ﬁnancial networks enabled resil-
ience building and mitigation efforts easier for BMC. Though it was
considered costly and time consuming, the mapping efforts at
micro zone level and the ability to use them through capacity
building at the local level has enabled local authorities at the ward
level to be prepared for any disaster and respond to them imme-
diately. Use of Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR)
by BMC, integrated both bottom-up and top-down disaster risk
reduction by integrating traditional and scientiﬁc knowledge
(Gaillard & Maceda, 2009).
4. Discussion: understanding and visualizing (mega-urban)
risk complexity
The ﬁndings from the literature review, the newspaper anal-
ysis, the household survey and the in-depth interviews with lay
people and experts on the Mumbai ﬂoods reveal the complex
genesis of a disaster event in a megacity: The interconnection and
interaction of different factors, causes, drivers and actors and their
complexity of interdependences is visualized in a comprehensive
diagram (Fig. 4). Tracing back some of the primary risk factors'
root causes, makes it possible to reveal the complex conﬁgurations
(i.e. the multiple linkages and feedback mechanisms), which are
adding to the multi-dimensional risk of mega-urban ﬂoods: 1. The
physical event of an unprecedented rainfall affecting distinct areas
in the city differently was nothing but a starting point. 2. Lack of
capacities of the municipal corporation to maintain the existing
drainage network and to organize regular waste collection, for
example, reduces the drainage network's capacity. Thus, admin-
istrative deﬁcits and the citizens' way of dealing with this (waste
disposal in the nullahs) inﬂuenced the secondary risk factors that
constituted the disaster setting. 3. This human, in this case
government-based, causation coincided with another, complex
and localized spatio-social setting, namely the historic evolution of
synergetic transformation of natural environments by society, i.e.
an urban landscape vulnerable to inundation. This creation of an
artiﬁcial landscape by different actors resulted in another sub-
complex of factors in which land sealing, vegetation decline, an
insufﬁcient drainage system and changing discharge patterns
interact. 4. On a smaller scale, the settlement of people with
different incomes (especially the urban poor) in the Mithi river's
ﬂood plain was substantially e but in locally different ways e
adding to the risk by exposing them to the ﬂooding risk but also
by narrowing the river bed and the ﬂood plain. This has to be seen
in the larger context of marginalization processes, which struc-
turally result in poor people residing in more disaster-prone and
less healthy locations. 5. Further amplifying factors, e.g. lack ofinformation due to insufﬁcient judgement of the situation by of-
ﬁcials which led to inappropriate decisions being made and lack-
ing response capacities (human and technical), further aggravated
the situation. 6. Infrastructural deﬁcits resulted in delays in
delivering disaster relief in affected areas, and the failure of
communication systems hindered the coordination of disaster
response forces. All these factors together (risk complex) resulted
in a multidimensional disaster with its speciﬁc effects. In addition,
other factors, that only became relevant once the disaster had set-
in, resulted in secondary risks and the development of risk chains
and cascades (Fig. 4).
From a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) perspective, one can
state, that the resilience of the mega-urban system, being a social-
ecological system consisting of built infrastructure and society
helped the system to return to functioning within normal param-
eters soon. In this, informal social networks turned out to have
become an important factor. Some subsystems did not return back
to their earlier state of functioning quickly, for example the heavily
affected slum communities whose development paths were dis-
rupted. And also the city's disaster management structure under-
went change and restructuring during the system's recovery
period. Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) also
enabled the empowerment of excluded communities, especially
those living in vulnerable areas, to integrate with the risk reduction
measures. Use of ICT has enabled the BMC to forecast and
disseminate knowledge to local levels within a short time to miti-
gate disasters and minimize their ill effects. Thus, the aftermath of
the 2005 ﬂood has brought forward maps and enabled local
administration to use technology-friendly and more ‘people- and
community-centric’ communication during disaster more than
ever before.
Since new warning systems are in place and the disaster man-
agement structures have been reorganised, the risk complex has
been altered. The next ﬂood event will occur in a reorganised
Complex Adaptive System. This change in the city's preparedness
can be interpreted as successful utilization of social memory, which
„has been deﬁned as the arena in which captured experience with
change and successful adaptations, embedded in a deeper level of
values, is actualized through community debate and decision-
making processes into appropriate strategies for dealing with
ongoing change. Social memory is important for linking past ex-
periences with present and future policies“ (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, &
Norberg, 2005: 453). This is also evident in the reaction to the
heavy rainfalls the city received in June 2015. With 243 mmwithin
24 h, this event was the most severe torrential rain the city expe-
rienced since the 2005 event (The Hindu, 2015). Reports in different
newspapers show on the one hand that the city is relatively better
prepared e even if the effects on daily life are still severe and of-
ﬁcials have been criticised heavily. On the other hand the 2005
ﬂood event is referred to in most of the reports, showing its
importance as a collective social memory (DNA, 2015; The Hindu,
2015; Hindustan Times 2015).
Some changes in the disaster risk complex have partly moder-
ated the primary effects of ﬂood events and most probably also
helped to stop the evolution of risk chains and risk cascades. From
the expert interviews and the analysis of the newspapers we can
deﬁnitely state, that the management of annual ﬂooding events has
been improved: nullahs are blocked less often and areas, which are
often inundated, are now quickly cleared of water, since local
pumps have been installed. However, there are also doubts about
Mumbai's disaster preparedness. First, some of the infrastructures
created, are not maintained as good practice would demand; sec-
ond, many of the measures announced have not been ﬁnalised
(especially the renovation of the city's storm water system) and
third, informal practices prohibit planning and applying measures
Fig. 4. The Mumbai 2005 ﬂood event from a CAS perspective.
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third, investments have been channelled to increase the pre-
paredness for ﬂood events, leaving aside the necessary measures
for other risks (earthquakes, ﬁres, epidemics etc.).5. Conclusion
In the literature, unprecedented levels of complexity have been
identiﬁed as distinct feature of megacities (e.g. Parker, 1995;
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which looks at these “global risk areas” from a CAS perspective. Our
analysis of the 2005 ﬂood event in Mumbai based on this unique
perspective demonstrates that this provides added value for a more
comprehensive view on (mega-urban) disasters. The framework
developed in section two (Fig. 1) and its application in the context
of theMumbai ﬂood (Fig. 4) can be read as a visualised “map” of the
connections between the various factors inﬂuencing each other. It
emphasises the links between the different elements of the city as a
system and the potential amplifying or moderating feedback
mechanisms. Thus it makes the risk complex inwhich disasters can
occur better understandable and illustrates which effects a disaster
can have either directly or indirectly through risk chains and risk
cascades. From our point of view this perspective allows for a better
understanding of the ﬂood risk, since it goes beyond the analysis of
the symptoms. Instead, the CAS perspective aims at tracing the
mediate risk factors and the root causes of disasters in urban areas.
Even if some of these root causes cannot be modiﬁed, it is impor-
tant to actively take them into consideration in risk governance.
However, the application of CAS/resilience-theory by governments
does not go without critique. Welsh (2013) critically states that the
CAS perspective, emerging from resilience theory, places disasters
in a post-political sphere and has the potential to be exploited by
neoliberal governance regimes: The strength of communities to
prepare for the unexpected in this logic would mean less re-
sponsibility for the government but place the burden on the com-
munity. In contrast, our argument is that a CAS perspective should
help decisionmakers to enhance their understanding of the genesis
of disasters and should encourage to pro-actively include social
memory.
The meta-level mapping of risk factors allows for a next step,
which would then be the actual mapping of the location and
measuring/qualitative description of risk factors, their connections
and dynamics. This would not only allow for identifying zones of
high risk but also draw attention to spatial proximity of vulnerable
structures and populations and to understand them and their
complex mutual interferences in their speciﬁc local setting. Thus,
identifying possible connections, amplifying factors and antici-
pating spill over effects (risk chains, risk cascades) can be visualized
and understood based on an empirical basis. Mapping risk factors
in Complex Adaptive Systems can increase the understanding of
connections and feedbacks (dynamic mapping of processes) and a
mapping of vulnerable structures and population groups would be
beneﬁcial for risk governance. A non-hazard-centred view (i.e. not
only focussing on ﬂoods, but emphasizing the embedding (risk
complex) in which a disastrous ﬂood can occur) on the connections
and feedbacks between speciﬁc system elements would be a next
step. Such an altered perspective allows for increasing prepared-
ness for and the management of unexpected events or events of
unexpectedmagnitude. If mega-urban risk governance and disaster
management are based on a systemic understanding of complex
risk, risk cascades and risk chains, they can be modiﬁed much
easier to respond to hazards more effectively.
A challenge though is the mapping of resilience factors, espe-
cially “soft” non-technical aspects such as social capital. It became
evident in theMumbai study that the ‘state dominated government
structures’ seldom consider ‘social capital’ in knowledge con-
struction and decision-making processes and largely exclude social
networks and other informal assets. The focus on mostly technical
and quantitative solutions leaves (spatially bound and complex)
knowledge unused. As the application of CBDRR methods proves,
communities know a lot about past events e and this knowledge
can be activated by participatory mapping for risk assessments. As
of now the utilisation of this speciﬁc spatial knowledge by urban
planners and disaster risk management experts remainsimprovable and their understanding of the spatiality of complex
spatio-societal interconnections remains in an early stage. One
reason is that complex structures, processes and actors are not
taken into consideration adequately, which might be solved by
visualisations like those proposed here in ﬁgures one and four. The
high potential of informal institutions and self-organisation pro-
cesses, which is characteristic for urban settlements in the LMIC,
therefore remains unused. New forms of multi-layered risk- and
disaster governance should therefore take these informal struc-
tures and actors into consideration.
Spatial knowledge and its visualisation can be an important
foundation for new strategies, if it is 1) not limited to the scientiﬁc-
technical knowledge of “experts” but includes also “social mem-
ories” and 2) depicts the complexity that constitutes the (potential)
disaster setting. Our case study did not primarily aim at under-
standing spatial construction of knowledge, but the results we
produced with our CAS approach informs about the understanding
of spatial knowledge production. The joint efforts in the aftermath
of the ﬂood event in Mumbai in 2005 illustrate that alternative
approaches towards governing mega-urban risk, based on alter-
native mapping methods, can offer serious beneﬁts for formal risk
governance structures. Especially the utilisation of social memories
and an understanding of disasters rooted in the complexity theory
provides an important, yet not fully utilised source of (spatial)
knowledge for risk governance.References
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